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ABSTRACT 
 
JOSH MCCRAIN:  When do Revolutions Lead to Democracy?  The Conflict between 
Democracy and Governance in Georgia and Tunisia  
(Under the direction of Graeme Robertson) 
 
The revolutions that began in Tunisia in late 2010 spread across the region and toppled 
many seemingly durable authoritarian regimes in the Arab world.  These revolutions in 
the name of democracy drew many comparisons to the popular color revolutions of the 
early 2000s that ousted leaders of post-communist regimes in Georgia, Ukraine and 
Kyrgyzstan.  Through the benefit of time, observers have noted that the democratic 
quality of these Eurasian regimes is lacking, and many now exhibit the same 
characteristics of the regime they deposed through revolution – a worrying sign for 
democrats in the Arab world.  This thesis compares the cases of Georgia and Tunisia by 
focusing on the conflict between the progressions of democracy versus governance in 
democratizing, post-revolutionary regimes.  In post-revolutionary regimes, either 
democracy or governance will prevail at the cost of the other, lending key insights into 
the future democratic development of the case in question.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In December 2010, the self-immolation of a fruit vendor in Tunisia led to massive, 
popular protests that led to the ouster of authoritarian President Ben Ali.  These protests 
quickly spread throughout the rest of the Arab world resulting in regime change in four 
countries (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen) and substantial changes in the composition 
of governments in four others (Morocco, Jordan, Kuwait and Oman).  The wave-like 
nature of these events – how they spread and the use of similar tactics – led many 
observers to note the similarities among the Arab Spring revolutions and the so-called 
Color Revolutions in the early- to mid-2000s in post-Communist Eurasia and the 1989 
revolutions (Way, 2011). 
 The Color Revolution model, which most scholars note as beginning in Slovakia 
in 1998, led to democratic breakthroughs
1
 or challenges to the incumbent regime in most 
of the semi-authoritarian (also referred to as hybrid) regimes in the post-Communist 
sphere.  The most notable of these cases are the Georgian Rose Revolution in 2003, the 
Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004, and the 2005 Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan 
(although there were failed attempts at electoral revolution in other Eurasian states).  
These cases, frequently referred to as “electoral revolutions” (Bunce and Wolchik, 2006; 
                                                          
1
 In this paper, I will use democratic breakthrough and revolution interchangeably.  Since there is some 
debate, particularly in the context of the color revolutions, as to whether these events are truly 
‘revolutionary’, it is perhaps more productive to think of them as ‘democratic breakthroughs’. 
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Orenstein and Kalandadze, 2009) because of their utilization of fraudulent elections as 
the focal point for contestation against the incumbent regime, serve as useful case studies 
for scholars and policy makers interested in understanding the challenges to 
democratization that post-revolutionary regimes face.  Optimism ran high after pro-West 
opposition leader Mikheil Saakashvili led his coalition in Georgia to overthrow 
Communist-era holdover, President Eduard Shevardnadze.  Similarly in Ukraine a year 
later, when autocratic President Leonid Kuchma’s hand-picked successor lost in Supreme 
Court-forced fair elections, pro-democracy actors were highly optimistic.   
 By the time protests spread to Kyrgyzstan, where they quickly turned violent, 
optimism began to temper.  Saakashvili in Georgia cemented power within the 
presidency winning his first election with 96 percent of the vote.  Democrats in Ukraine 
soon realized that free and fair elections are only an ingredient of a democratic country, 
not democracy themselves.  Scholars began to renege on their formerly optimistic 
predictions and started to question the ability of electoral revolutions to lead to real 
democracy.  In recent years, there have been promising democratic developments in each 
of these countries, but they have been accompanied by authoritarian setbacks.  The Color 
Revolutions taught scholars and observers to remain critical following revolutions in 
authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes.  By recognizing these events as democratic 
breakthroughs, rather than democracy itself, scholars have begun to assess the 
idiosyncrasies of post-revolution democratizing countries. 
 The Arab world represents scholars with a laboratory in which to test and hone 
their theories developed in the context of the Color Revolution.  The Arab Spring also 
presents new challenges that were not salient in post-Communist Eurasia.  By comparing 
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Tunisia, the country that ignited the Arab Spring, to the Georgian Rose Revolution, the 
beginning of the Color Revolution wave, this paper will examine two cases of democratic 
breakthroughs caused by revolutions.  I will examine whether democracy from revolution 
is possible in cases such as these, and, if so, what determines success versus failure.  
Additionally, if I find that the existing theory is insufficient in explaining events in 
Tunisia, I will attempt to further develop the existing literature in light of the Arab 
Spring. 
 This paper will proceed as follows.  First, I will introduce relevant literature to 
establish the theoretical lens through which to compare Georgia and Tunisia.  Next, I will 
develop the cases of these two revolutions keeping in mind the established theories.  I 
will then analyze these cases and assess whether the theory is sufficient for explaining in 
events in Tunisia, which is an indicative case of the larger Arab Spring.  Finally, I will 
summarize my findings. 
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE AND THEORY 
 
 
 Shortly after the Rose Revolution in Georgia, scholars and observers were 
unreservedly optimistic about the future for democracy in Georgia and the region.  
Lincoln Mitchell wrote in 2004 that the ouster of Shevardnadze “represented a victory 
not only for the Georgian people but for democracy globally” (p. 342).  Once this 
revolutionary fervor began to spread to other countries in the region, such as Ukraine and 
Kyrgyzstan, Bunce and Wolchik noted that these events were “just as regionwide in 
[their] scope and just as powerful in [their] democratizing effects as the first wave that 
occurred during the years from 1988 to 1992” (2006, p.5).  The optimism is easy to 
understand.  Georgia, Ukraine and even Kyrgyzstan – all countries with no historical 
experience with democracy – experienced a change in regime that threw out autocratic 
strongmen of the former Soviet nomenklatura.  Moreover, the wave-like nature of these 
protests, which included similar tactics and training by dissidents of the antecedent cases 
of revolution, seemed to many to be a successful model for other hybrid regimes to 
employ in overthrowing their autocratic leaders.  Putin himself expressed concern about 
the ‘Orange model’ spreading to Russia (Levitsky and Way, 2010). 
 The stated goals of democracy by the revolutionary opposition leaders – now 
presidents and prime ministers – fell far short of the expectations of democrats within 
their countries and outside observers.  Substantial authoritarian backsliding led many 
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scholars to wonder about the ability of electoral revolutions to develop the preconditions 
for liberal democracy.  Orenstein and Kalandadze note that electoral revolutions are 
insufficient in themselves in producing democracy (2009).  The ‘electoral fallacy’ – that 
elections make a democracy (Schmitter & Karl, 1991) – was a tool that these opposition 
leaders used successfully in order to come to power.  By focusing protests around clearly 
fraudulent elections, and promising the opposite if they were to be in power, they 
convinced supporters of their democratic credentials (Orenstein and Kalandadze, 2009).  
In reality, “electoral revolutions are too narrow to address the full range of issues holding 
back democratization,” and Saakashvili in Georgia was able to legitimate and centralize 
his power through winning his first free and fair election with 96 percent of the vote – not 
an outcome characteristic of many liberal democracies (Orenstein and Kalandadze, 2009: 
p. 1404). 
 Orenstein and Kalandadze focus on the fact that electoral revolutions tend to fall 
short of addressing the underlying problems within authoritarian regimes, such as an 
“underdeveloped culture of political competition and party politics, power conflicts 
beyond the electoral circle, corruption, and lack of the rule of law” (2009: p. 1420).  
Essentially, the fraudulent elections serve as a focal point around which opposition 
leaders are able to organize an often disparate cadre of parties, groups and citizens around 
the goal of “democracy” – whatever that may mean at the time.  While there are certain 
qualities that set apart electoral revolutions, such as the scheduled catalyst of widely-
perceived fraudulent elections, other focal points can complete this framework.  In 
Tunisia, the self-immolation of a fruit vendor sparked protests, and in the rest of the Arab 
World, protest in one country was a sufficient focal point to ignite protests in neighboring 
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countries.  Nonetheless, the flaw of ‘narrow aims’ inherent within electoral revolutions is 
also a trait within other revolutionary pushes for democratization, like those in the Arab 
Spring-affected countries. 
 Once the revolutionary regimes came to power, it quickly became evident that 
they would pursue agendas that did not vary all that much from their autocratic 
predecessors.  As Henry Hale (2005; 2011) and others (Mitchell, 2008; Levitsky and 
Way, 2010; Bunce & Wolchik, 2011) have pointed out, the leaders of the successful 
opposition groups were often themselves, at some point, autocratic elites.  Hale takes the 
concept a step further and develops a theory in which he sees these revolutions as cycles 
within the normal realm of political contestation in a regime (2005).  In authoritarian 
regimes with strong presidents, ‘patronal presidents’ in his terminology, these cycles 
occur less frequently, and may not happen at all until a focal point is present.  These focal 
points consist of term limits, old age or illness, elections, or the presence of a mass 
protest movement that forces the elites to show their strength (and thus forces other elites 
to decide whether to stay allied with the incumbent regime or defect).  He finds that many 
of the Color Revolution cases fall into this paradigm of regime realignment, and that 
when these focal points presented themselves, key pro-regime elites defected and led 
opposition movements (Hale, 2005). 
 The analysis of this paper, however, is less interested in the reasons regime fall 
and more concerned with the democratic outcome of states that have experienced regime 
change due to some sort of revolution.  Hale’s theory serves to shed some light on this 
question.  He argues that seeing revolutionary events, particularly in patronal presidential 
systems, not as democratic breakthroughs but as “contestation phases in regime cycles 
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where the opposition wins” will produce a more accurate understanding of the post-
revolution outcomes (Hale, 2005: p. 161).  He continues, “the political contestation is at 
root an elite affair where powerful groups compete to manipulate mass opinion through 
biased media and machine politics. That the masses are not infinitely manipulable, 
however, gives them an independent and often important role in deciding outcomes” 
(Hale, 2005: p. 162).  Thus, analyzing regimes in this framework – in which the Arab 
Spring cases fit particularly well – provides us with a better understanding of why former 
pro-regime elites tend to dominate politics post-revolution, and how these regimes may 
break this cycle to produce more durable democratic outcomes. 
 Current theory tends to understate the inherent conflict between democratization 
and governance in post-revolutionary, democratizing countries.  In Contention and 
Democracy, Charles Tilly sets the following assertions: 
2) Trajectories of regimes within a two-dimensional space defined by (a) 
degree of governmental capacity and (b) extent of protected consultation 
significantly affect both their prospects for democracy and the character of 
their democracy if it arrives. 
3) In the long run, increases in governmental capacity and protected 
consultation reinforce each other, as state expansion generates resistance, 
bargaining and provisional settlements, on one side, while on the other 
side protected consultation encourages demands for expansion of state 
intervention, which in turn promote increases in capacity. 
4)At the extremes, where capacity develops farther and faster than 
consultation, the path to democracy (if any) passes through 
authoritarianism; if protected consultation develops farther and faster than 
capacity and the regime survives, the path then passes through a  risky 
zone of capacity building (2003: p. 7). 
 
In effect, if capacity – in other words governance – increases faster than protected 
consultation develops – that is, “the breadth and quality of relations between 
governmental agents and members of the government’s subject population” (Tilly, 2003: 
p. 13) – then number 4 above should be expected.  This scenario is arguably in evidence 
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in many post-revolutionary democratizing countries.  The revolutionary regime comes to 
power, quickly entrenches and consolidates this power, marginalizes potential 
challengers, and in the process becomes a semi-authoritarian, illiberal democracy.  On the 
other hand, as we have seen in countries like Kyrgyzstan, Egypt and Tunisia following 
revolution, protected consultation has seemed to develop ‘farther and faster’ than 
capacity.  The ‘risky zone’ that Tilly notes in these countries is democratic chaos. 
 Stoner-Weiss and McFaul (2008) note some caveats to this line of thinking in The 
Myth of the Authoritarian Model, in which they attempt to debunk the idea that Putin’s 
increasingly authoritarian Russia is more stable than if it were a democracy.  I believe, 
however, that cases that have recently experienced a revolution and find themselves in 
the volatile democratization stage that follows do not necessarily equate to Putin’s 
Russia.  Stability, or lack thereof, in these revolutionary cases, is linked more closely to a 
combination of factors discussed above. 
 Hale (2011) expands the literature of democratization in revolutionary regimes 
through developing a model that helps to explain the divergence in certain cases.  His 
focus on the development of formal constitutions in democratizing regimes sheds light on 
how some regimes are able to overcome the challenge presented by the 
democracy/governance competition while some tend to merely experience a recycling of 
authoritarian elites.  Specifically, he notes that in these states constitutions that give the 
most power to the presidency “tend to generate expectations of future political power that 
encourage clientelistic networks to coordinate their activities around a single dominant 
political machine led by the directly elected president” (Hale, 2011: p.582).  On the other 
hand, “constitutions formalizing two independent holders of roughly equal executive 
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power (divided-executive constitutions), will complicate coordination around a single 
patron, thereby working against the amassing of formal and informal power around the 
president” (Hale, 2011: p.582).  Thus, according to Hale, constitutions and formal 
institutions in young democracies have the ability to be very influential in the immediate 
phases of democratization precisely because they in turn affect informal institutions.   
 Empirically, Hale sees two salient examples of this model:  Kyrgyzstan and 
Ukraine.  Kyrgyzstan, on the one hand, established a constitution that focused power in a 
single executive, leading to yet another revolution after the initial Tulip Revolution.  As 
Hale notes, this is not necessarily because the constitution is “obeyed” or “followed,” but 
it is more likely because it creates a formal focal point for elite contestation around a 
single, powerful office (Hale, 2011).  Ukraine, however, initially established a 
constitution where power is shared, which created a system where (sometimes autocratic) 
elites fought amongst themselves for power.  This system was not wholly democratic, but 
it did lead to mostly free and fair elections and turn-overs in power – a first for post-
communist Ukraine.  Since the Orange Revolution, the Ukrainian constitution returned to 
one that gives asymmetrical power to the presidency, and as a result we have seen some 
renewed authoritarianism.  Still, the existence of a divided-executive constitution resulted 
in real political competition.  These cases embody two ‘typical’ trajectories that regimes 
may take after overthrowing an authoritarian government through a revolution.  The 
model represented by Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia, as we will see later, increases the 
likelihood that a regime will first have to pass through a renewed period of 
authoritarianism.  Ukraine’s trajectory creates better preconditions for democratization, 
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but it does not necessarily lead to democratic outcomes.  I will examine whether Tunisia 
fits into this paradigm. 
 Finally, Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way make an important and relevant 
contribution to the literature regarding semi-authoritarian regimes (2010).  The authors 
argue that semi-authoritarian regimes with both a high degree of linkage and leverage are 
those that are most likely to democratize.  They find that in cases with a high degree of 
Western leverage – defined as a “governments' vulnerability to external democratizing 
pressure” (Levitsky and Way, 2010: p. 40) – and a high degree of linkage – the “density 
of ties and cross-border flows among particular countries” and the West (p. 42)  – will 
democratize more quickly than those with a low degree of both.  Specifically, leverage 
facilitates the West in using punitive action or the promise of an award to encourage 
democratic development.  However, leverage alone can lead to illiberal democracy, but 
when combined with high linkage liberal democracy is more likely to be an outcome.  
This theoretical model helps explain the success of democratization in post-communist 
CEE, the lack of success in the color revolution cases, and it allows us to hypothesize for 
the Arab Spring revolutions. 
 To summarize the literature outlined above, revolutions in semi-authoritarian or 
authoritarian regimes after the fall of communism very rarely produced liberal 
democracies.  Orenstein and Kalandadze, as well as other scholars, argue that the 
‘electoral’ model of revolution that many post-Soviet states experienced was insufficient 
for establishing the preconditions for democracy.  However, and as we are seeing in the 
Arab world, many of the same reasons they saw this model as insufficient – an 
underdeveloped political culture, extensive corruption, etc. – are very much in existence 
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in the Arab Spring cases.  Further, Henry Hale states that these democratic breakthroughs 
are more likely, or more accurately, regime cycles, and it is inaccurate to characterize 
them as revolutionary events.  If we view these events then as simply focal points or brief 
democratic openings along a more drawn-out process of democratization we are better 
equipped to analyze the events in the Arab world.  It is possible for a revolution to lead to 
democratization, and eventually perhaps liberal democracy, as Hale (2011) argues
2
, but 
the trajectory of the process is path-dependent on the initial phases of development after 
the revolution.  Further, the quality of democracy following revolution will be lacking 
because of one of two reasons:  1) democratization outpaces increases in governance or 
state capacity and the fundamental causes of revolution are not addressed (such as 
corruption, state weakness, etc.); or 2) governance develops faster and further than 
democracy, which may lead to substantial improvements in certain conditions (again, 
corruption, for example), but will likely lead to authoritarian backsliding.  Finally, 
Levitsky and Way argue empirically that if a semi-authoritarian regime is to democratize 
at all, it will be in a context of a high degree of outside linkage and leverage. 
 
 
                                                          
2
 Notably, Carothers (2002) warns against assuming that all regimes that find themselves in the 
‘democratization’ process are actually progressing towards democracy.  It is very possible they may be 
sliding back towards authoritarianism paired with some progress in developing democracy. 
  
 
CHAPTER 3 
ARGUMENT:  GOVERNANCE VERSUS DEMOCRACY 
 
 
 Based on the theory presented above, I develop my argument as follows:  
authoritarian or semi-authoritarian states that have experienced democratic breakthroughs 
because of revolutionary movements or mass protest follow a typical model if they are 
indeed democratizing.  The democratization process after revolution is characterized by 
two phases.  First, these states undergo a pivotal period immediately after the change in 
power defined by a conflict between a strengthening of governance and a strengthening 
of democracy (Tilly’s argument).  The nature of this conflict depends on conditions 
within the state prior to the regime change (history of democracy, existence of democratic 
institutions, etc.) and the character of the opposition which initially seizes power.  The 
nature of the opposition that comes to power, and the method through which it achieved 
its takeover, is highly determinative in defining the governance/democracy conflict which 
immediately develops.  A unified opposition with massive popular support will likely 
pursue different policies and have more legitimacy than an elite-led opposition that 
deposes a weak president. 
As Tilly states, ideally governance and protected consultation develop more or 
less at the same pace and reinforce each other – in which case liberal democracy is a 
likely outcome.  There are few examples of this in post-communist revolutions.  After the 
success of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in democratizing – thanks 
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to the leverage of the European Union (Vachudova, 2005) – most countries, particularly 
those that experienced a color revolution, passed through, or are currently passing 
through (or stagnating in), authoritarianism on the way to democracy (again, we should 
not assume that all authoritarian regimes are democratizing).  In the CEE cases, the EU 
was able to encourage a development of governance and democratization that was 
mutually reinforcing instead of contradictory.
3
  As Levitsky and Way (2010) demonstrate 
empirically in non-CEE cases, the countries with the highest degrees of linkage and 
leverage to the West were those with the highest likelihood of democratization.  Further, 
in all of the post-communist cases of electoral revolutions, according to Orenstein and 
Kalandadze (2009), none led to real, liberal democracy in the immediate years following 
revolution (with the partial exception of Peru.  See Table 1).  It was only after a period of 
either democracy or governance outpacing the other that any progress occurred.   
With this in mind, I argue that the only instances of democracy and governance 
developing in a reinforcing nature are where there exists a very substantial amount of 
linkage and leverage, as was the case in CEE.  This leverage can enforce legitimacy of 
democratic development; it can promote the growth of democratic opposition 
movements; it provides assurance that real change occurs through elections (particularly 
salient in Tunisia where street demonstrations are the preferred method of contestation); 
and in cases of very high leverage it can force institutional changes that promote 
governance in concert with liberal democratic norms (rewriting the constitution or 
                                                          
3
 As Vachudova (2005) argues, the reasons for the EU’s success in this period were multi-faceted.  It was a 
combination of 1) active leverage where Brussels was able to enforce the changing of laws, institutions, 
and the overall political environment by placing countries into the accession process so that they could 
become EU members; and 2) passive leverage, which is essentially the appeal of the EU common market to 
the underdeveloped post-communist economies of CEE and the benefits they would receive by being a part 
of this market.   
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existing legislation, for example).  Without a powerful actor like the EU which is able to 
utilize its leverage so effectively – through a combination of active leverage in the form 
of the accession process and passive leverage through the existence of the common 
market (and it is hard to imagine another instance such as the fall of communism in CEE 
where these unique conditions exist) – it is very unlikely that a post-revolutionary, 
democratic regime will effectively establish democracy and governance in a reinforcing 
manner.  Thus, we can assume the default trajectory for post-revolutionary regimes in 
this first phase – in the absence of outside leverage as strong as the EU’s after 
communism – is a period of conflict between democracy and governance where one is 
likely to prevail at the cost of the other. 
One possible counterpoint to this argument is that the CEE states had high levels 
of effective governance by the end of communism.  When these regimes opened up, then, 
all that was left was a maturation of democracy and the entrenchment formal democratic 
institutions.  The EU, however, was imperative in the trajectory of these cases.  The 
ability of authoritarian-minded elites to take advantage of the strong governance to build 
institutions that consolidated their control over power and their ability to seek rents was 
severely mitigated by the presence of the EU.  Further, the EU provided legitimacy and 
credibility for democratic opposition parties and eventually reformed illiberal, rent-
seeking elites through forcing them to contest power in a democratic political climate.  
Without the EU, the strong governance that existed in these states may have facilitated a 
new series of moderately effective but highly illiberal regimes (such as Malaysia, 
perhaps).  Ultimately, the first phase was still in existence in CEE, but the EU accelerated 
15 
 
its progression and facilitated a mutually enforcing development of democracy and 
governance that would not have occurred in its absence. 
 
Table 1 – Scores for Cases of Electoral Revolution 
Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Armenia 5/4 5/4 4/4 4/4 4/4 4/4 4/4 4/4 5/4 5/4 5/4 
Azerbaijan 6/5 6/4 6/4 6/4 6/5 6/5 6/5 6/5 6/5 6/5 6/5 
Belarus 6/6 6/6 6/6 6/6 6/6 6/6 6/6 6/6 7/6 7/6 7/6 
Ethiopia 4/5 4/5 4/4 5/5 5/5 5/5 5/5 5/5 5/5 5/5 5/5 
Georgia 4/4 3/4 3/4 3/4 4/4 4/4 4/4 4/4 3/4 3/3 3/3 
Kyrgyzstan 4/4 4/4 5/5 5/5 6/5 6/5 6/5 6/5 6/5 5/4 5/4 
Madagascar 2/4 2/4 2/4 2/4 2/4 2/4 3/4 3/3 3/3 3/3 4/3 
Peru 4/3 5/4 5/4 5/4 3/3 1/3 2/3 2/3 2/3 2/3 2/3 
Serbia 6/6 6/6 6/6 5/5 4/4 3/3 3/2 3/2 3/2 3/2 3/2 
Togo 6/5 6/5 6/5 5/5 5/5 5/5 6/5 6/5 6/5 6/5 6/5 
Ukraine 3/4 3/4 3/4 3/4 4/4 4/4 4/4 4/4 4/3 3/2 3/2 
Selected cases are cases of electoral revolutions according to Orenstein and Kalandadze (2009).  Scores are 
from the annual Freedom in the World report; years of revolution are in bold.  The first number is Political 
Rights and the second Civil Liberties. 
 
 The second phase is essentially what Hale (2011) describes in the development of 
formal constitutions in determining informal politics and is highly path-dependent on the 
first phase described above.  I argue, however, that the influence of a formal constitution 
is much less effective if the conflict described above has not settled or subsided.  A 
formal constitution that creates a divided-executive or parliamentary model, if adopted 
too early after revolution, will likely exacerbate the political turmoil created by the 
revolution.  The most organized opposition group, if there is one, will maintain a 
monopoly on power.  If this group is comprised of former elites, as Hale (2005) notes 
tends to be the case, developments in formal and informal politics will likely favor these 
elites and their allies.  Similarly, if instead a single-executive constitution takes effect too 
early, as we saw in Georgia, informal politics will “coordinate their activities around a 
single dominant political machine,” and the new regime, in the context of a disunified 
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opposition and legitimacy through their recent arrival to power, will establish 
authoritarian policies that entrench the regime’s position of power (Hale, 2011: p. 582). 
 Thus, I find Hale’s (2011) theory to be most applicable once the revolutionary 
turmoil has subsided and governance has improved.  While a divided-executive 
constitution that takes effect shortly after the revolutionary regime comes to power may 
set more promising conditions for democracy than a single-executive constitution, neither 
model is likely to produce democratization until the democracy/governance conflict has 
settled.  After the first phase has had time to play out the impact of a formal constitution 
is much more decisive in the trajectory of the regime.  At this point elections can produce 
lasting results, institutions are more difficult to ignore, an opposition has had time to 
develop, and international pressure is likely to be more effective.  However, if the first 
phase was characterized by too little democratic development, the state and regime may 
be so far down the road to authoritarianism that any changes in formal institutions are 
only worth their face value.    
 Georgia is a typical case of democratization following the overthrow of a (semi-
)authoritarian regime through popular protest.  Like other cases of revolution in the name 
of democracy (Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Serbia, for example), some progress occurred 
following the removal of the autocratic regime, but in the immediate aftermath the 
conflict between democracy and governance began. This conflict then served to highlight 
the democratic shortcomings of the new regime while establishing the basis for future 
democratic development.    As we will see, Georgia experienced a formative period of 
competition between democracy and governance after the Rose Revolution.  Eventually, 
once institutions developed, governmental capacity increased, and a somewhat-unified 
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opposition began to form, a new constitution came into power and has had a substantial 
impact on the democratic trajectory of the country.   
 
Hypothesis 
My expectations are that, through an examination of the events up to, during, and 
following the Jasmine Revolution, Tunisia is currently in the first phase outlined above.  
Specifically, Tunisia is experiencing a period of turmoil after the revolution characterized 
by a few idiosyncratic factors:  1) the sudden collapse of a particularly strong 
authoritarian regime with extensive clientelistic ties; 2) the lack of a unified opposition 
movement that was primarily responsible for the turnover in power (such as Saakishvili’s 
Rose Coalition in Georgia or the Orange Coalition in Ukraine); and 3) the existence of a 
formerly marginalized but very sizeable political element in the form of the Ennahda, the 
Islamist party.  In effect, due to these factors and the massive popular support for 
democracy during the revolution, democratic development has far outpaced the 
development of governmental capacity in the early stages of the post-Ben Ali era.  The 
period of political development currently underway in Tunisia is a pivotal point for 
setting the foundation for further democratization.  Finally, for liberal democracy to 
eventually flourish in Tunisia there must first be a period of strengthening the quality of 
governance in the country, and this is likely to be accompanied by authoritarian 
backsliding. 
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 4 
CASE STUDIES:  THE ROSE AND JASMINE REVOLUTIONS 
 
 
 This section will examine two cases of revolution that led to regime change:  
Georgia and Tunisia.  I argue that Georgia is a typical case of regime change and 
democratization through revolution.  Specifically, it is typical because of the following 
characteristics:  a) the Georgian state under Shevardnadze was not a liberal democracy 
and had characteristics of a semi-authoritarian regime; b) as Orenstein and Kalandadze 
(2009) note, there was an absence of certain necessary democratic pre-conditions when 
Saakashvili took power after the Rose revolution; c) immediately after the revolutionary 
leadership came to power, democratic development was mixed with authoritarian 
backsliding; and d) eventually the conflict between democratization and governance 
begins to stabilize and we see, following Hale’s (2011) model, the formal and informal 
entrenchment of more promising democratic principles in the context of improved 
governance (Table 2).  Through examining Georgia through this framework, I will set the 
groundwork for analyzing Tunisia’s post-revolutionary trajectory.   
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Georgia – The Rose Revolution 
 
Table 2 – Georgia Scores 
Year Freedom House Control of Corruption Government Effectiveness 
2000 4 -0.88 -0.73 
2001 4 N/A N/A 
2002 4 -1.14 -0.88 
2003 4 -0.65 -0.5 
2004 3.5 -0.61 -0.49 
2005 3 -0.37 -0.42 
2006 3 -0.05 -0.18 
2007 4 -0.26 0.1 
2008 4 -0.23 0.28 
2009 4 -0.24 0.27 
2010 3.5 -0.13 0.29 
2011 3.5 -0.04 0.55 
Sources:  Freedom House scores come from Freedom in the World  reports.  Control of Corruption and 
Government Effectiveness are available through the World Bank Governance Indicators.  Year of 
revolution is in bold. 
 
 After the fall of communism, the newly-independent Georgian state, led by 
former members of the Soviet nomenklatura, quickly turned into a typical post-
communist semi-authoritarian regime.  Former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard 
Shevardnadze, who seized the presidency after a coup in 1992, cemented his position as 
president through establishing informal clientelistic ties among the Georgian elites and 
through other typical authoritarian means such as fraudulent elections and marginalizing 
opposition movements.  However, the booming economy in the 1990s served to placate 
the citizenry while satiating rent-seeking elites, limiting any serious challenge to 
Shevardnadze’s rule (Levitsky and Way, 2010).  By the late 1990s, the ubiquity of 
corruption, which existed in the “very fabric of the state,” began to dismantle the 
Shevardnadze regime (Wheatley, 2005: p. 135).   
 By 2002, rampant corruption, elections widely recognized as fraudulent, and a 
crumbling economy weakened Shevardnadze’s hold on power and his influence over key 
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elites.  Seeing an opening to vie for control over Georgia’s extensive clientelistic network 
of resources, elites began to defect from Shevardnadze and an opposition movement – led 
by Shevardnadze’s Justice Minister, Mikheil Saakashvili – began to take shape.  In 
response to the fraudulent outcome of the 2003 parliamentary elections, protestors 
gathered in Tbilisi, and on November 23, 2003, Saakashvili and his supporters stormed 
parliament while Shevardnadze was delivering a speech, forcing the president to flee. 
 Immediately following the Rose Revolution, Saakashvili and his allies continued 
what Bunce and Wolchik call the “unfortunate tradition in post-Soviet Georgian politics 
… wherein power is seized through extra-constitutional means, citizens then rally around 
the new leader, and elections are finally held to legitimate the transfer of office” (2011: p. 
235).  Once Saakashvili cemented his position through elections, by winning 96 percent 
of the vote, his ruling coalition began to undertake constitutional reforms that 
concentrated power in the presidency while marginalizing the role of the parliament 
(Mitchell, 2006).  Members of parliament were “reportedly coerced” into supporting 
constitutional changes; positions at all levels of government were tied to loyalty to 
Saakashvili; the media became less independent than under Shevardnadze; and NGO 
leaders, many of whom were government watchdogs, received positions in Saakashvili’s 
government (Mitchell, 2006). Previously, despite these worrying signs for the 
development of future democracy, Saakashvili successfully reduced corruption and 
improved some economic conditions (Mitchell, 2006). 
 Through ameliorating the rampant corruption and general lack of effective 
governance that characterized the Shevardnadze regime, Saakashvili maintained 
legitimacy and successfully avoided a color revolution-style challenge to his regime 
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through improvements that had “strong effects on people’s everyday lives” (Mitchell, 
2008: p. 84).  By 2008, however, things began to get worse for Saakashvili.  The August 
2008 war with Russia over the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
catalyzed some of Saakashvili’s Rose Revolution allies to challenge his presidency.  
While this conflict did draw the United States into announcing its support for Saakashvili, 
it also served to increase outside scrutiny of his regime.  Also during this period the 
European Union began using its (albeit softer) leverage to encourage democratization in 
Georgia through including it in the European Neighborhood Policy agreements.  The 
post-revolutionary grace period was over for the Saakashvili and his supporters, and the 
semblance of an opposition began to form backed by Western legitimization.  Sporadic 
protests, albeit small in size, began on the streets of Tbilisi, with some facing violent 
opposition by the government.   
Things began to quiet down in 2010 and the Georgian parliament passed 
constitutional amendments, which will come into effect in 2013, that transform the 
Georgian political system to a parliamentary model, changing the Georgian political 
landscape in the manner described by Henry Hale (2011).  In 2011, tensions renewed and 
protests were put down violently by the government.  The international criticism directed 
towards Saakashvili after these protests – largely a product of the August 2008 conflict 
with Russia – began to signify a developing weakness of his regime to Georgian elites.  
Despite decreasing popularity, the opposition remained disjointed and lacked any form of 
a cohesive message.  As the parliamentary elections approached in late 2012 few thought 
Saakashvili’s United National Movement (UNM) coalition faced any serious electoral 
threat (Financial Times, 2012).   
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On October 1, 2012, billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili – who was initially barred 
from running for office because he held a Russian passport – and his Georgian Dream 
coalition received 54 percent of the vote, defeating Saakashvili’s UNM coalition.  Not 
only did Ivanishvili’s victory surprise observers – he was up comfortably in polls only 
two weeks prior to the election (Financial Times, 2012) – the defeat of Saakashvili will 
be the first peaceful turnover of power in Georgia since gaining independence from the 
Soviet Union.  There are still many concerns surrounding this outcome, however.  
Ivanishvili’s Dream Coalition is a tenuous collection of disparate parties and groups, 
some of which are overtly supported by Russia.  There is certainly some concern about 
this coalition’s ability to remain unified, particularly once Saakashvili is out of the 
picture.  Further, Ivanishvili will have to share power with Saakashvili until the October 
2013 presidential elections.  Saakashvili has been highly critical of Ivanishvili since the 
elections, and Dream Coalition MPs have already overturned a Saakashvili veto 
(Economist, 2012).  This political infighting has the potential to crescendo before a new 
president is elected in October.  Nonetheless, the October 2012 peaceful transition of 
power is a very promising sign for the future of Georgian democracy:  governance has 
improved to such a point where, as I developed in my argument, formal institutions 
should have a lasting impact.   
 
Tunisia – The Jasmine Revolution 
 
Table 3 – Tunisia Scores 
Year Freedom House Control of Corruption Government Effectiveness 
2009 6 -0.09 0.35 
2010 6 -0.14 0.19 
2011 3.5 -0.21 0.02 
2012 3.5 N/A N/A 
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 Tunisia is a logical choice for comparison when considering post-communist 
revolutions that produced democratic breakthroughs.  Tunisia’s pre-revolutionary regime, 
led by President Ben Ali, was highly authoritarian; elections were meaningless, and Ben 
Ali’s regime had tight control over all aspects of the political culture within the country 
(Freedom House has Tunisia with a 6 ‘Freedom Rating’ in the year prior to revolution, 
where Georgia has a score of 4).  Moreover, Tunisia has no historical experience with 
democracy, and its political history since gaining independence from France in 1956, 
until the 2011 ouster of Ben Ali, is characterized by two strongman presidents and a lack 
of meaningful political competition – even at the elite level.  Largely due to 
underdevelopment of democratic institutions, and for other reasons I will examine below, 
once Ben Ali was removed from power democratic development was mixed with 
authoritarian backsliding (although, as we will see, the causes for this vary from what 
happened in Georgia).  Finally, I will examine the potential for consolidating liberal 
democracy – or at least the mitigation of further authoritarian developments – based on 
empirical observations. 
 On January 14, 2011, after 28 days of protests that became known as the Jasmine 
Revolution, Tunisia experienced its first change in power in 23 years – and this time in 
the name of democracy.  Few, if any, expected that these protests would lead to the fall of 
President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali’s Western-supported, secular, authoritarian, regime. 
Coming to power in 1987 through a constitutional coup, Ben Ali quickly entrenched his 
position among the Tunisian elites and consolidated vast amounts of power in the 
presidency (Schraeder and Redissi, 2011).  Despite promising developments early in his 
reign, such as the development of a market-based economy and a relatively modernized 
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conception of women’s rights (Freedom House, 2012), his regime quickly demonstrated 
its lack of commitment to democratization.  Along with the typical semi-authoritarian 
practices – repressing opposition groups, silencing independent journalists, etc. – Ben Ali 
began to establish a durable autocratic regime through the creation of a “strong neo-
corporatist state” and a pervasive intelligence-based police force (Schraeder and Redissi, 
2011: p. 6).    
Ben Ali’s presidency became a textbook example of Henry Hale’s (2005) model 
of patronal presidentialism:  “The key to personal success [during Ben Ali’s reign] was 
not achievement in a given field, but links to the extended family of the ubiquitously 
photographed president” (Schraeder and Redissi, 2011: p. 6).  Rent-seeking elites tied 
themselves to his regime, and members of Ben Ali’s extended family occupied almost 
every position of power within the government (Goldstone, 2011).  As a result, state 
capture in Tunisia “trickled down through state institutions and state-run industries to 
petty corruption, including bribes, at the lowest level” (Freedom House, 2012).  The more 
these elites relied on Ben Ali for their positions and for economic rents, the less likely 
they were to oppose his enduring reign. 
Moreover, Ben Ali’s substantial security forces were responsible for 
imprisonment, harassment, and reported torture of Islamic activists and other vocal 
opposition forces (Freedom House, 2012).  This forced secularization completely 
marginalized the Islamic political element in Tunisia, making it an attractive target for 
Western support.  The Washington Post wrote in 2011, “Tunisia was perceived by the 
West as a model nation in the Arab world - moderate, relatively prosperous and secular. 
The autocratic leader…stamped down on Islamic radicalism; he was a U.S. ally in the 
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war against terrorism in a region where al-Qaeda was making inroads.”  Thus, as 
Tunisia’s authoritarian tendencies increased the necessity of having a non-Islamic ally in 
the region for the West continued to outweigh the desire to criticize Ben Ali’s regime.  In 
this climate, Ben Ali won five consecutive presidential elections – the most recent, before 
his fall, in October 2009 with 89 percent of the vote – and breezed through a 
constitutional three-term term-limit in 2002 by handing an amendment off to the “rubber 
stamp” Chamber of Deputies (Schraeder and Redissi, 2011: p. 8). 
The preceding paragraphs should explain, then, why Ben Ali’s ouster through 
popular protest surprised so many.  His security forces, numbering around 130,000 (this 
number does not include the roughly 8,000 in the Presidential Guard and 20,000 in the 
National Guard), had successfully quelled a sizable protest as recently as 2008 (Schraeder 
and Redissi, 2011: p. 6).  Further, Tunisia did not ride the wave of protest that spread 
throughout the Arab world – it began it. 
Looking back on the events of late 2010, it seems there are two overarching 
factors that led to the fall of Ben Ali’s seemingly resilient authoritarian regime.  First, 
economic conditions in Tunisia were dire and disproportionately affected the younger 
generation – those who took to the streets in the greatest numbers in the Jasmine 
Revolution. The 2008 global financial crisis devastated the country:  unemployment 
skyrocketed, with the 18-24 demographic the hardest hit at over 30 percent; and austerity 
measures undertaken in Europe caused a substantial decrease in remittances sent to 
Tunisia (Schraeder and Redissi, 2011).  The struggling economy did not affect everybody 
equally, however.  During these two years, the rampant, state sponsored corruption 
became both more ubiquitous and more widely perceived.  As more and more 
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unemployed Tunisians had to deal with blatantly corrupt officials, at all levels of 
government, their frustrations began to reach a tipping point (Freedom House, 2012).  For 
one 26 year old fruit vendor, who was the sole income earner for a family of eight, the 
daily harassment for petty bribes by local police officers pushed him over that tipping 
point.  On 17 December 2010, the fruit vendor Mohamed Bouazizi lit himself on fire in 
the small town of Sidi Bouzid, and he eventually died in the hospital on the fourth of 
January. 
Protests quickly spread throughout the country, and Ben Ali authorized his 
security forces to use violence to quell the uprisings.  Between 17 December and the end 
of January, at least 300 were killed and more than 700 were wounded in these 
demonstrations (Schraeder and Redissi, 2011).  On January 13, President Ben Ali, in the 
face of overwhelming opposition to his continued rule by protestors and mounting 
international pressure against his security apparatus’ use of violence, went on TV and 
announced that he would step down by the end of his term in 2014.  The next day, 
however, after violence continued against the protestors, the military stepped in and 
chased off the remaining pro-Ben Ali security forces (Bloomberg, 2011).  That day, Ben 
Ali fled the country and sitting Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi took over as acting 
president.  Thus, the second determining factor in the relatively quick ouster of Ben Ali, 
and the avoidance of a drawn out situation such as in Syria, or what could have been in 
Libya without Western involvement, was the existence of a highly professional, 
independent military in Tunisia (Barany, 2011). 
The period initially after Ben Ali stepped down was highly tumultuous.  Two 
former Ben Ali-friendly elites, his Prime Minister and President of the Chamber of 
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Deputies, took control over the interim government, which ignited new unrest (Schraeder 
and Redissi, 2011).  Following violent clashes with riot police, protestors forced acting 
Prime Minister Ghannouchi and the entire Ben Ali cabinet to resign, leaving 84 year old 
Béji Caïd Essebsi to take over as Prime Minister.  Essebsi, a critic of Ben Ali’s regime 
during his tenure of power, banned Ben Ali’s RCD party, ordered the arrest of key pro-
Ben Ali elites, and dismantled the massive political police apparatus (Schrader and 
Redissi, 2011).  Additionally, Essebsi took steps to combat the rampant corruption in his 
country and “confiscated the properties, assets and businesses of 110 members of Ben 
Ali’s family, including the ex-president and his wife” (Schraeder and Redissi, 2011: p. 
15).  Finally, the media began to open, further steps were taken to begin addressing 
corruption, and elections were scheduled for October 2011. 
Despite the positive steps made in the first months after Ben Ali’s fall, the interim 
government was characterized by the same poor economic conditions that plagued Ben 
Ali’s regime.  Moreover, the country was still in turmoil after the dismantlement of the 
massive Ben Ali security apparatus leading to further violence and unrest (Schrader and 
Redissi, 2011).  The power vacuum resulted in the creation of dozens of political parties 
with the only organized opposition group coming out of the fray as Ennahda.  Ennahda, 
the Islamic-oriented political party which was almost completely marginalized under Ben 
Ali, quickly established itself as the only truly unified political organization in Tunisia.  
The newly relevant Islamic political element in Tunisia began to push Tunisian politics 
down a troubling road of religious governance, and secular elements of society have been 
singled out and even physically attacked (Countries at the Crossroads, 2012).  It was no 
surprise then that the first ever free and fair elections in Tunisia, held 23 October 2011, 
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saw the Ennahda party obtain a 42 percent plurality and 89 of the 217 seats in the 
Constituent Assembly – the body that would be responsible for both governing and 
drafting a constitution (Cavatorta, 2012).   
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 5 
ANALYSIS 
 
 
The examination of the cases of Georgia and Tunisia highlighted some 
similarities and differences in their trajectories after pro-democracy revolutions.  Georgia 
and Tunisia were authoritarian regimes with little semblance of democracy prior to 
revolution.  Each state was characterized by a patronal president (Hale, 2005) with 
extensive clientelistic and informal political networks.  Additionally, each state 
experienced a protest-supported revolution which resulted in the removal of the 
authoritarian president from power.  As Orenstein and Kalandadze (2009) note, Georgia 
did not possess certain characteristics that are favorable for the establishment of liberal 
democracy following a revolution.  Tunisia clearly lacked the same characteristics (see 
Table 3).  Georgia and Tunisia similarly experienced a pivotal period of political 
development in the months following each of their respective revolutions, although these 
periods produced different outcomes.  In Georgia, Saakashvili pursued policies that 
greatly increased government capacity – a stark contrast to the weakness of the 
Shevardnadze regime (see Table 2) – which led to the noticeable improvement in the day-
to-day life of many Georgians (Mitchell, 2008).  However, democratization stalled and 
Saakashvili’s regime began to backslide towards authoritarianism. 
In Tunisia, on the other hand, this period has so far been characterized by an 
abundance of democratic openings paired with little progress as far as governmental or 
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state capacity.  Georgia and Tunisia both exhibited many similar characteristics prior to 
the revolutions that overthrew their authoritarian regimes.  In 2002, the year prior to the 
Rose Revolution, Georgia ranked 85
th
 in terms of corruption according to Transparency 
International.  In 2009, Tunisia ranked 65
th
 according to the same index.  In Georgia and 
Tunisia, partly due to rampant corruption, the economy was struggling.  Similarly, 
elections were meaningless in each state; political power was almost completely 
consolidated in the presidency (and thus elites relied on the presidency for their 
positions); and the first semblance of a unified opposition in both Tunisia and Georgia 
only appeared immediately prior to the revolution (unlike, for example, Solidarity in 
Poland prior to the fall of communism).  Additionally, the first regimes to takeover power 
after the revolution in each state were comprised of former elites with extensive ties to 
the authoritarian regime that was just removed:  Saakashvili, a former Justice Minister in 
Georgia, and Ben Ali’s Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi taking over the interim 
government in Tunisia.  Why, then, were the initial periods of development once the new 
regime came to power so different? 
 One possible explanation is a comparison of the role of protest in each case.  In 
Georgia following the fraudulent elections, which occurred on 2 November, the largest 
protests consisted of no more than 5000 people until 22 November (Mitchell, 2004: p. 
345).  Mitchell, who was an observer on the ground during the revolution, writes that the 
opposition’s rhetoric surrounding the scale of their movement “appeared out of place for 
what seemed like small demonstrations largely by the political class” (2004: p. 345).  By 
the time Shevardnadze’s regime was chased out of office, the largest observed protests 
were likely no more than 60,000 people (Welt, 2006: p. 14).  The small size of the 
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demonstrations, combined with the elite-led quality of the opposition movement, led 
some scholars to observe that the Rose Revolution was, in reality, little more than a coup 
(Tudoriou, 2007). 
 In Tunisia, the story was quite a bit different.  According to reports, up to 100,000 
people were on the streets prior to Ben Ali’s ouster, and 40,000 to 100,000 continued to 
protest the Ghannouchi government once he came to power (PressTV, 2011).  Not only 
were these protests larger, but they were also sustained and continued to demand change 
after the regime fell.  In Georgia, once Saakashvili calls for democracy ceased as his 
regime claimed legitimacy through its rise to power and quickly held elections.  The 
continued protests in Tunisia led to the resignation of the entire Ben Ali cabinet, 
essentially wiping the slate clean and creating an environment for a true turnover in 
power as opposed to a recycling of elites. 
 Another factor that explains the different development in these cases is the 
existence of the marginalized Islamic political element in Tunisia.  In Georgia the only 
salient marginalized elements existed in the semi-autonomous regions such as Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia.  These populations are relatively small and afforded a high amount of 
regional sovereignty, and they were not as marginalized as the Islamic groups in Tunisian 
society.  The explanation for the marginalization of these groups during Ben Ali is clear.  
Ben Ali knew that through using authoritarian methods to ensure Tunisia remained 
secular, he would be ensuring the support of Western powers such as the US and France.  
As Sheri Berman notes, countries such as Egypt (prior to the recent revolution) with large 
Islamic elements which are politically marginalized will see these Islamic elements 
manifest in civil society (2003).  Further, these states tend not to allow large-scale 
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political organizing, particularly if it is contrary to the government’s interests, thus 
Islamic-led civil society fills the void.  It is not surprising then that in the first real 
political opening in Tunisia we see the most organized political group manifest in the 
form of an Islamic political party, Ennahda. 
 Finally, and largely because of the impact of the new politically-relevant Islamic 
element, Tunisia’s first elections produced substantially different outcomes than 
Georgia’s first elections after the Rose Revolution.  In Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili 
united all the relevant elites who supported Shevardnadze, and when he held elections to 
completely legitimize his position, there was no opposition.  He won with 96 percent of 
the vote.  In Tunisia, on the other hand, the secular parties were unable to unite in the 
same way as Ennahda, thus Ennahda won a plurality of the vote.  Unable to form a 
government, Ennahda entered into a disparate coalition with a left-wing nationalist party 
and a social democratic party (Cavatorta, 2012).    
 
Outcomes 
 As Tilly states in these cases, when protected consultation develops faster than 
government capacity, and if the regime survives – something that has not been certain in 
Tunisia – the country passes through a “risky zone of capacity building” (2003: p. 7).  In 
Tunisia, the democratic experiment since revolution has been tumultuous.  The 
government has made little progress in building capacity, and the “key factors that 
contributed to the 2010 uprising continue to plague the country” (Countries at the 
Crossroads, 2012).  The government has had to focus its efforts into holding together a 
coalition of disparate parties and respond to continued uprisings by a public that knows 
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little experience with democracy and saw the most effective means of political change as 
public demonstrations.  In December 2012, for example, a conflict between leftists and 
Islamists left 250 protestors wounded.  As The Economist writes, “The rallying cry of the 
revolution, “Dégage!” (“Clear off!”), is again being heard, only this time in connection 
not with a widely loathed dictator, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, but with a provisional 
government that Tunisians themselves proudly voted into office only a year ago” (2012). 
 Empirical measures support the assertion that following revolution, either 
democracy or governance tends to flourish.  As we see in Table 2, democracy scores 
stagnated near pre-revolution levels in Georgia, but government effectiveness and control 
of corruption saw significant improvements.  In Ukraine, democracy improved but the 
other two measures did not.  In Tunisia, the early data seems to indicate a trend similar to 
Ukraine, and empirical observations of political conditions support that.  It is important to 
note, though, that Ukraine’s development has significantly different causes than that of 
Tunisia.  Following the removal of Kuchma and his oligarchic, authoritarian regime, 
political competition became much more open and competitive.  However, this 
competition was largely among the same elites without much influence from a truly 
democratic opposition, and other institutions more or less remained the same from the 
Kuchma era.  As explained by the theory, some democratization occurred, but 
improvements in governmental capacity did not come with it.  Thus, when former 
Kuchma protégé Yanukovych won election, it was not difficult for his regime to 
consolidate power and adjust institutions to his liking.  This explains the recent 
backsliding in Freedom House scores.  
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Nonetheless, the question remains as to whether Tunisia will be able to make it to 
the second phase of democratization as described above.  According to Hale’s theory, the 
electoral outcomes in Tunisia are an inherently positive development for the country.  
Power is formally divided, and informal politics are unable to center on a single position 
of power.  However, as I have argued, divided power at this stage of the process is not 
necessarily helpful in establishing liberal democracy, and governance must develop 
before these liberal norms and institutions are entrenched. An increase in governance is 
most likely to occur through a phase of authoritarianism, which will likely have the effect 
of limiting the amount of competition that currently exists in Tunisia.  So, in contrast to 
Georgia where Saakashvili was the sole purveyor of political power, Tunisia not only had 
a divided government, but one with a disparate ruling coalition and in a context where 
only one party received more than 8 percent of the vote.  Georgia passed through an 
initial phase of authoritarian development – with a single, strong executive – which 
facilitated an increase in governance by limiting openings for a democratic challenge to 
the legitimacy of its actions.  On the other hand, Tunisia’s current path is better 
characterized by a substantial democratic opening but very little progress in building 
governance and state capacity. 
Georgia’s development occurred largely because, as Mitchell (2008) writes, 
Saakashvili turned a blind-eye to democratic development in the early years in favor of 
policies to combat corruption, for example.  By focusing on developing governance and 
state capacity and improving conditions that directly affected many of Georgia’s citizens, 
Saakashvili maintained legitimacy for his regime by being able to point to improvements 
in their lives.  Eventually, and largely a product of an increase in linkage and leverage as 
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described by Levitsky and Way, Georgia authorized a divided-executive constitution and 
governance has matured enough during the semi-authoritarian years that this new 
constitution might have a substantial impact on the future of Georgian democracy. 
Based on my theory presented above, I expect recent developments in Georgia to 
be very positive in regards to its democratic development.  As Table 1 demonstrates, 
during the years after the Rose Revolution, democratization stagnated, but control of 
corruption and governmental capacity both increased significantly.  According to 
Transparency International, Georgia improved from 124
th
 in 2003 in its control of 
corruption (out of a total of 133) to 51
st
 in 2012.  This period of semi-authoritarianism 
allowed for the maturation of a democratic opposition and the development of 
functioning institutions.  As outlined by Hale, the constitutional changes have already 
demonstrated their effectiveness by causing increased competition in the October 2012 
elections.  However, it is also possible that the upcoming Ivanishvili era could consist of 
political infighting due to the potential fragility of his coalition.  The Georgian state, 
unlike Tunisia, may be able to handle a fragile ruling coalition because of the maturation 
of key institutions and norms.  Otherwise, if Ivanishvili’s regime develops in a semi-
authoritarian manner, it would be able to effectively entrench power because of its 
legitimacy through elections and the higher quality of Georgian institutions.  Finally, 
Georgia’s political development is now in a context of higher outside scrutiny than in the 
past. 
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Table 4 – Ukraine Scores 
Year Freedom House Control of Corruption Government Effectiveness 
2000 4 -1.07 -0.75 
2001 4 n/a n/a 
2002 4 -1.02 -0.66 
2003 4 -0.86 -0.58 
2004 3.5 -0.89 -0.54 
2005 2.5 -0.69 -0.58 
2006 2.5 -0.68 -0.57 
2007 2.5 -0.74 -0.68 
2008 2.5 -0.79 -0.72 
2009 2.5 -1.02 -0.82 
2010 3 -0.99 -0.78 
2011 3.5 -0.99 -0.83 
 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 The revolution that began in December 2010 in Tunisia and spread throughout the 
Arab World represents fertile grounds for further academic studies on regime change and 
democratization.  Just as the color revolutions in the early 2000s fostered academic 
debates on regime change and semi-authoritarianism (Bunce and Wolchik, 2009; Silitski, 
2009; Way, 2008, 2009), the Arab Spring events have led many to wonder if liberal 
democracy is possible in a region where few thought it would ever occur.  The early 
stages of development in many of the afflicted countries – Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya – 
have seen mixed results.  On the one hand, the regimes in these countries prior to the 
Arab Spring were highly authoritarian, often Western-supported, and had little-to-no 
historical experience with democracy.  Contested elections and openings in media 
freedom, for instance, have been huge steps forward in these cases.  On the other hand, 
the post-revolutionary regimes have either taken up some of the same authoritarian 
practices as their predecessors (Egypt) or had little success in promoting true liberal 
democracy (Tunisia). 
 Once the initial optimism faded in post-communist Eurasia, scholars and 
observers began to note that elections do not make a democracy and that a revolution is 
not in and of itself enough to place a country on the road towards democratization.  
Although the Arab Spring events have garnered comparisons to the 1989 revolutions 
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(Way, 2011), few expect the democratization period that is currently underway to be 
anywhere near as successful.  However, as demonstrated by Georgia, substantial 
democratization is possible following a democratic breakthrough or revolution, but it is 
unlikely to be quick or easy.  Analyzing the events in the early- to mid-2000s in Eurasia 
and the literature that followed serves to provide key insight into the question of whether 
revolution truly can produce liberal democracy. 
In this paper, I have compared Tunisia, the country that ignited the Arab Spring, 
to the Georgian Rose Revolution, the case that began the color revolution ‘wave’ (Bunce 
and Wolchik, 2006).  This paper did not seek to add to the substantial body of literature 
of why semi-authoritarian regimes succumb to or outlast democratic challenges (Bunce 
and Wolchik, 2006; Hale, 2005; Levitsky and Way, 2010; for example); instead, I chose 
to analyze how a revolutionary regime may democratize through a comparison of 
Georgia and Tunisia.  I established a theoretical framework that suggests in post-
revolutionary regimes – except in the CEE cases after communism (because of the role 
the EU played) – there necessarily exists a risky zone that sees either democracy or 
governance progress at the cost of the other.  Furthermore, I alter Hale’s (2011) 
framework of formal constitutions determining informal politics to rely on an imperative 
improvement of governance before a formal constitution can make a lasting impact on 
the political environment within a country.  If this development of governance is absent 
and democratic openings occur instead then, assuming the regime survives, formal 
institutional changes are likely to have little impact on democratization.  In short, 
governance must improve – which is most likely to occur through a period of renewed 
authoritarianism – for durable liberal democracy to develop. 
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I argue Georgia is a ‘typical’ case for democratization after a democratic 
breakthrough in the period after the fall of communism.  As such, Georgia exemplifies 
the following stages:  1) a highly path-dependent period when the revolutionary regime 
first comes to power characterized by a conflict between the developments of governance 
and democracy (the ‘risky zone’); 2) governance outpaces democratization (Tilly, 2003); 
3) formal constitutions and institutions have a much more determinative impact on the 
longer-term democratization in the country (Hale, 2011).  Moreover, democracy in 
Georgia has a more positive future than democracy in Ukraine – where many thought 
democracy had actually succeeded due to revolution – precisely because Georgia has 
succeeded in dividing power after a period of improvement in governance (Table 4). 
Tunisia is currently in the first phase:  the contradictory development of 
democracy and governance.  Because of different conditions surrounding the turnover in 
power in Tunisia when compared to Georgia, this phase seems to indicate democratic 
openings are succeeding at the cost of improvements in governance, and empirical 
measures support this claim (Table 3).  The political openings created by the fall of Ben 
Ali have led to an abundance of political contestation often marred by violence and street 
demonstrations.  Without improvements in the political process that see disagreements 
resolved through voting and debate instead of on the street, it is unlikely any real 
improvements will occur in the poor quality governance of Tunisia.  Tunisia is on the 
verge of a vicious cycle of unrest, leading to further political ineffectiveness, leading to 
further unrest and potential new revolutions. 
Finally, this examination has highlighted certain factors that are relevant for the 
discussion of democratization in the post-Arab Spring countries.  For example, many of 
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these countries received substantial Western support during the authoritarian periods 
largely because they remained secular, non-Islamic regimes.  Now that they are more 
open, and their people can vote for the leaders they want, the West must learn to work 
with less-palatable regimes.  Partly due to this, these regimes are unlikely to get the kind 
of support that the Eurasian states received from the US and the EU on one side or Russia 
on the other.  Thus, discussions on the democratization of these countries must take into 
account the lack of leverage the West will have to employ on the trajectory of the post-
revolutionary regimes.  The future of democracy in the Arab world is far more positive 
today than in recent memory, but it rests precariously close to falling into the quagmire of 
semi-authoritarianism.   Without effective governance that improves the dire conditions 
that ignited many of these revolutions and balances the unique characteristics of these 
culturally diverse states, liberal democracy has little hope of a future in the Arab world. 
  
 
 
 
  
41 
 
Works Cited 
 
Barany, Zoltan. 2011. The Role of the Military. Journal of Democracy, 22(4), 24-35. 
 
Berman, Sheri.  2003.  Islamism, Revolution and Civil Society.  Perspectives on Politics, 
1(2), 257-272. 
 
Bloomberg. 2011. Egypt's Military Leaders Tighten Six-Decade Government Grip Amid 
Protests. 31 January 2011. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-31/egypt-s-
military-leaders-tighten-six-decade-government-grip-amid-protests.html 
(Accessed 1 April 2013). 
 
Bunce, V.J. & Wolchik, S.  2006. International Diffusion and Postcommunist Electoral 
Revolutions. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 39(3), 283-304 
 
———. 2009. Debating the Color Revolutions: Getting Real About "Real Causes." 
Journal of Democracy, 20(1), 69-73. 
 
———. 2011. Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Post-Communist Countries. New 
York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Cavatorta, F. 2012. Beyond Ghannouchi: Islamism and Social Change in Tunisia. Middle 
East Report 262, 20-25. 
 
Carothers, Thomas. 2002. The End of the Transition Paradigm. Journal of Democracy, 
13(1), 5-21. 
 
Countries at the Crossroads. 2012. Tunisia. 
 
Economist. 2012. Democracy and Riots. 8 December 2012 
.  
Freedom House.  1997-2013.  Freedom in the World. 
 
———. 2012.  Tunisia – Freedom in the World Report. 
 
Goldstone, J. 2011. Understanding the Revolutions of 2011. Foreign Affairs, 90(3), 8-16. 
 
Hale, H. E. 2005. Regime Cycles: Democracy, Autocracy, and Revolution in Post-Soviet 
Eurasia. World Politics, 58, 133-65. 
 
———. 2011. Formal Constitutions in Informal Politics: Institutions and 
Democratization in Post-Soviet Eurasia. World Politics, 63(4), 581-617. 
 
Kalandadze, K. and Orenstein, Mitchell. 2009.  Electoral Protests and Democratization:  
Beyond the Color Revolutions.  Comparative Political Studies, 42(11), 1403-
1425. 
42 
 
 
Levitsky, Steven and Lucan Way. 2010. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes 
after the Cold War.  New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Mitchell, L. 2004. Georgia’s Rose Revolution. Current History. 103(675), 342-348. 
 
———. 2006. Democracy in Georgia Since the Rose Revolution. Orbis, 50(4), 669-676. 
 
———. 2008. Uncertain Democracy. Philadelphia, PA: University of 
Pennsylvania Press. 
 
PressTV. 2011. Tunisians want PM Ghannouchi gone. 25 February 2011. 
http://www.presstv.ir/detail/167012.html (Accessed 1 April 2013). 
 
Schmitter, P. and Karl, T. 1991. What Democracy Is…and Is Not. Journal of Democracy, 
2(3), 75-88. 
 
Schraeder, Peter and Redissi, H. 2011. Ben Ali’s Fall. Journal of Democracy, 22(3), 5-
19. 
 
Silitski, V. 2009.  What Are We Trying to Explain?  Journal of Democracy, 20(1), 86-89. 
 
Tilly, Charles. 2003. Contention and Democracy in Europe, 1650-2000. Cambridge 
University Press. 
  
Stoner-Weiss, K. and McFaul, M. 2008. The Myth of the Authoritarian Model. Foreign 
Affairs, 87(1), 68-84. 
 
Tudoroiu, T. 2007. Rose, Orange, and Tulip: The Failed Post-Soviet Revolutions. 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 40(3), 315-342. 
 
Vachudova, Milada Anna. 2005. Europe Undivided. Oxford University Press. 
 
Washington Post. 2011. In Tunisia, Freedom Blossoms. 24 January 2011. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2011/01/23/AR2011012304126.html (accessed 1 April 2013). 
 
Way, Lucan. 2008. The Real Causes of the Color Revolutions. Journal of Democracy, 
19(3), 55-69. 
 
———.  2009.  A Reply to My Critics.  Journal of Democracy, 20(1), 90-97. 
 
Welt, Cory. 2006. Georgia’s Rose Revolution: From Regime Weakness to Regime 
Collapse. Working Paper. Stanford, CA: Center of Democracy Development, and 
the Rule of Law. 
 
43 
 
Wheatley, Jonathan. 2004. Elections and Democratic Governance in the Former Soviet  
Union: The Case of Georgia. Free University of Berlin. 
http://www.oei.fuberlin.de/cscca/Publications/boi_jw_elections_and_democratic_
governance.pdf 
 
World Bank. 2011. Governance Indicators. Available at 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_country.asp 
 
